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Sell's biography of Milosevic testifies to both the shiftiness of the man 
and the inflammatory atmosphere that made his rise possible. The author 
presents an individual that is at once ruthlessly determined to climb to 
the top and stay in power by manipulating nationalist rhetoric, and at the 
same time seemingly riding a wave of spontaneous popular activism into 
a future he neither understands nor controls. Sell perhaps best summed 
up the paradox inherent in both MiloseviC's career and his person with 
the observation that "Milosevic gave a good imitation of being a 
charismatic leader" (181). 
From the Serb leader's beginnings as a communist apparatchik, 
through the rush of power he first felt in 1987 at Kosovo Polje where he 
learned "how to tap into the powerful passion that Kosovo aroused 
among Serbs" (49), and finally into the Hague courtroom, Sell's book 
charts the jagged path Milosevic ploughed through the last two decades of 
Yugoslav history. The narrative is aptly signposted by chapter titles such 
as "A New Tito?," "Man of Peace," and "War Criminal." At times the 
biography attempts to understand the psychology of the man, detailing 
his "almost unnaturally close relationship" with his wife, his difficult 
family history, and his supposed narcissism. At others, the book offers a 
privileged view of Yugoslav domestic politics and Western diplomacy at 
work in the Balkans during MiloseviC's lifetime. Despite his insider status 
as a former Foreign Service officer in the region, Sell is often critical of 
U.S. involvement in the mediation process, nor can he conceal his 
sympathy for his former Swedish boss, chief European negotiator for 
Yugoslavia Carl Bildt, whom the U.S. leadership eventually brushed 
aside. . 
One notable feature of Sell's assessment of the domestic political 
scene in the first years of MiloseviC's rise is his condemnation of 
MiloseviC's "accomplices" in the "plot against Yugoslavia." Amongst 
them he includes the late Croatian and Bosnian leaders, Franjo Tudjman 
and Alija Izetbegovic, as well as the Slovene reformers that bailed out of 
Yugoslavia despite being "fully aware that their departure would lead to 
war in Croatia and Bosnia" (5). The Slovenes, Sell argues, enjoyed 
MiloseviC's support for their efforts at gaining independence because the 
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"secession of ethnically homogeneous Slovenia would give [Milosevi6] a 
freer hand to lop off the Serb-inhabited parts of Croatia" (115). 
But MiloseviC's plans with regard to Eastern Slavonia and the 
Serbian Krajina, as well as his relationship to the Serbs of Croatia, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo, was as paradoxical as his political career. On the 
one hand, the support of Serbs in other republics helped perhaps even 
precipitated his rise, and their presence gave him the political leverage 
necessary to keep half of Tito's Yugoslavia under his control, while on 
the other hand his power over them helped him to portray himself to the 
international community as the only man capable of effecting peace in 
the region. The novelty of Milosevi6's politics was, ironically, that he 
managed to cast the old internationalist rhetoric of minority protection in 
an equally old nationalist light, which leads Sell to reflect on whether 
MiloseviC's approach constituted an "ideology." Although the result of 
Sell's musings on the subject remains perhaps necessarily 
-inconclusive, he does point to MiloseviC's unique talent of "glorifying 
the Serbian past and attacking the nationalisms of the other Yugoslav 
peoples as anti-Serbian, revanchist, and genocidal," thereby presenting 
himself as a "moderate" (182). 
The fact that Milosevi6 remains a somewhat mysterious and 
seemingly anomalous figure in the region's history leads me to conclude 
that the ideological underpinnings of Milosevi6's politics may deserve 
closer scrutiny. Was his the face of Eastern European reform 
communism so feared by Moscow after WWII? Or is Milosevi6's 
ideology more comparable to the national communism of the other non-
aligned state: Romania under Ceauc;escu? Or is he a new breed of 
nationalist, hardened by the experience of communism, clearly aware of 
the power of nationalism, but no less savvy to the power of anti-
nationalist rhetoric in a rapidly changing Europe? Could it be that one 
contributing factor to Milosevi6's downfall was that his opponents 
learned the rhetoric, even the practice, if such exists, of "moderate" 
nationalism themselves and used it against him? 
There is some evidence in Sell's book to lead us to this 
conclusion. First there is the matter of Slovenia, which managed to slip 
out of Yugoslavia on the grounds that its ethnic homogeneity rendered it 
not only united, but also uninteresting to neighboring republics. Slovenia 
could have been as nationalist as it pleased but, without anyone to 
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victimize, it was not a good target for MiloseviC's finger-pointing 
"moderate" nationalism. 
Croatia, on the other hand, with a sizeable Serb minority, could 
be portrayed by Milosevic as victimizing its minority population; 
however, shortly after the international community realized that the 
Serbs were terrorizing the Croats, Tudjman took advantage of a window 
in 1995 when the world was considering air strikes against Serbian 
positions in Bosnia to sweep the Serbian minority out of Croatia with 
his "Operation Storm." The ethnic cleansing of Croatia of its minority 
Serbs is faithfully criticized by Sell and others, but the fact that the 
country thereby won a much-coveted ethnic homogeneity is treated 
much as historians treat Benes's expulsion of the Germans from 
Czechoslovakia after WWII; as an unfortunate, but diplomatically 
convenient fait accompli.! Tudjman was not the only one that believed 
that Operation Storm, "strengthened [Croatia's) position and its image" 
in the " new international order in the former Yugoslavia.,,2 
Meanwhile, the Kosovo Albanians learned from watching the 
wars in Croatia and Bosnia that the only way to force their continued 
victimization into the international spotlight was to abandon obeisance to 
the West in the form of Rugova's strategy of passive resistance. Sell 
quotes one senior KLA leader as saying "We mounted a peaceful , 
civilized protest to fight the totalitarian rule of Milosevic .... The result is 
that we were ignored" (278). 
The final blow to Milosevic was struck at home during the 2000 
elections, when the opposition united behind the only candidate that 
could stand up to Milosevic because he fit the description of a true 
Serbian advocate even better than Milosevic did; Vojislav Kostunica. A 
convinced nationalist , opponent of the NATO bombing and other 
foreign involvement in Serbian politics, Kostunica represented the 
ideology of " moderate " nationalism more perfectly than Milosevic, 
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Nor does Sell deny the diplomatic appeal of ethnic cleansing in the 
Bosnian conflict. Although he provides a horrifying description of the 
massacre at Srebrenica, Sell concedes that "the fall of Srebrenica and 
v 
the smaller enclave of Zepa had simplified the ethnic map of Bosnia and 
thereby made a diplomatic settlement easier to achieve" (234). 
From an August 19, 1995 interview with CNN correspondent Jacki 
Shymanski in Zagreb , http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/ Bosnia/ updates/ 
august95/ 8-19/ tudjman.html. 
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Tudjman, or the KLA because, as a staunch legalist, he embodied the 
spirit of moderation that Milosevic preached without practicing. 
Sell's book, by using a tone that does not pretend definitively to 
"explain" either the character of Milosevic or the sensitive and rapidly 
transforming political landscape of the former Yugoslavia, offers his 
readers the opportunity to reflect again on a period and a person we are 
not likely to grasp fully for a long time to come. 
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